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T 1990s were a period of unmitigated success
for the National Basketball Association ("NBA"). Michael Jordan, the league's most popular
player and one of the world's most recognized athletes, led his Chicago Bulls to six world
championships in the decade and the NBA finals to higher television ratings. Even though
Jordan announced his retirement in 1998, the league does not suffer from a lack of super-
stars poised to take his place. While the league may have lost Larry Bird as a player, it
later regained him as a coach. Ervin "Magic" Johnson's retirement due to contracting HIV
could have proven difficult for the league; instead, he was hailed as a hero for courageously
speaking out on his disease.
The players themselves shared in this success. The
average player's salary in 1998 exceeded $2.2 million, the
highest average for any professional team sport. 1
Contracts with values totaling over $50 million were
commonplace. The Atlanta Hawks signed Dikembe
Mutombo to a five-year contract that will pay him $56
million over its life;2 the Orlando Magic re-signed Horace
Grant to a five-year, $50 million contract; and the
Portland Trailblazers signed Kenny Anderson to a seven-
year, $50 million contract.3 The sports page headlines
game due to a labor dispute, ended its streak. The lock-
out ended six months after it began, resulting in a short-
ened season and a new six-year collective bargaining
agreement, or CBA.
12
This Article will discuss the status of agents for NBA
players after the adoption of the new collective bargain-
ing agreement (the "1999 Agreement"). First, this Article
will summarize the relevant provisions of the prior col-
lective bargaining agreement (the "1996 Agreement")
and illustrate how application of these provisions led the
owners to declare a lockout. Next, it will review key pro-
Bargaining Agreement
screamed blockbuster deal after blockbuster deal. Seattle
re-signed Gary Payton to a seven-year, $85 million con-
tract;4 the Washington Wizards agreed to a seven-year,
$105 million contract with Juwan Howard; 5 the Miami
Heat awarded Alonzo Mourning a seven-year contract
worth $105 million;6 and Shaquille O'Neal inked a seven-
year, $120 million deal with the Los Angeles Lakers. This
parade of record deals culminated with Kevin Garnett's
six-year, $125 million contract with the Minnesota
Timberwolves.
7
The owners profited as well, despite paying these
astronomical salaries, as they entered into lucrative tele-
vision contracts with NBC and TNT in 1997. NBC pur-
chased exclusive over-the-air network rights to the NBA
through the 2001-02 season at a cost of $1.74 billion.
8
Time-Warner subsidiary Turner Broadcasting entered
into a four-year contract extension with the league,
granting it exclusive national cable television rights at a
cost of $890 million.9 The contracts more than doubled
what the two companies has paid for the previous four-
year contracts 10 and will net each franchise about $23
million over each of the four contract years. 1
1
Despite these positive factors or perhaps due to them,
the NBA and the Players Association recently went to
war over how to divide the enormous revenues being gen-
erated by the league. The sides could not settle their dif-
ferences and so the owners elected to lock out the players
at the end of the 1997-98 season. The lockout dragged on
through the summer and was not resolved prior to the
scheduled beginning of the 1998-99 season. The NBA,
which had taken great pride in never having missed a
visions of the 1999 Agreement. It will conclude by dis-
cussing how the new CBA and the recent consolidation in
the sports representation business will affect agents.
Provisions in the 1996 Collective
Bargaining Agreement
The NU3A Salary Cap
The concept of a team salary cap in professional sports
is not new. As the name implies, a salary cap places a
limit on the combined salary one team can pay its play-
ers in a given year. A cap serves two main purposes.
First, imposing an upper limit on a team's largest oper-
ating expense provides team owners with some degree of
cost certainty. Second, at least in theory, a cap promotes
parity among the teams in a league by preventing one
team or a small group of teams from signing all of the
best (and presumably most expensive) players.
A salary cap has a long history in professional basket-
ball. In its 1946-47 inaugural season, the league institut-
ed a $55,000 salary cap and has maintained one since.
The structure for the modern-day salary cap was intro-
duced in the 1983 NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The innovation contained in the 1983
Agreement was a salary cap based on a percentage of the
league's gross revenues, which consisted of gate receipts,
local and national broadcast revenue, and preseason and
postseason revenue. 13 The 1987 Collective Bargaining
Agreement continued the use of a salary cap and guar-
anteed that aggregate player salaries would equal at
least 53 percent of the league's revenues. Spurred by the
emergence of such stars as Magic Johnson, Larry Bird,
and Michael Jordan, the popularity of the NBA skyrock-
eted. Hand in hand with its growing popularity came new
sources of revenue. When the time came to negotiate a
new agreement with the league in 1996, the players
demanded a share of these new revenue streams. As a
result, the 1996 Agreement expanded the definition of
gross revenues (which was termed "Basketball Related
Income" or "BRI") to include a portion of the revenue gen-
erated from luxury suites, international television, and
arena signage. The salary cap was equal to 48.04 percent
of BRI under the 1996 Agreement.
Exceptions to the Salary Cap
Unlike the "hard" cap in the NFL, the NBA's version
contained exceptions that allowed a team to exceed the
salary cap under certain circumstances. For example, the
1996 Agreement contained the "$1 Million Exception."
This clause allowed teams already over the salary cap to
sign one or more players to one- or two-year contracts,
provided that their aggregate first-year salary was less
than $1 million. A team could utilize this exception only
every other year.
The primary exception to the cap, however, dealt with
what the CBA termed "Qualified Veteran Free Agents."
This provision became popularly known as the "Larry
Bird exception." In short, the Bird exception allowed
teams to ignore the cap and re-sign certain veteran play-
ers at any price. In pertinent part, the rule reads:
A team may re-sign its own free agent for any
amount if he played for the team for some or
all of each of the prior three consecutive sea-
sons (or, if he changed teams, he did so only by
assignment or by signing with his prior team
during the first of the three seasons).
14
In an era when star players in other sports jump from
team to team chasing the highest salary, the purpose of
this rule was to create an incentive for marquee players
to stay with a single team.
The manner in which the 1996 Agreement dealt with
rookies compounded the potential player cost problem
associated with the Bird exception. The league wanted to
ensure that a team could always sign a first-round draft
pick regardless of the team's cap situation, limit the
amount that teams had to pay to unproven rookies, and
give a player's team the ability to re-sign him to a longer
term contract if the team desired. To this end, the 1996
Agreement also instituted a three-year rookie salary
scale that limited payments to first-round draft picks. A
team could pay this rookie salary regardless of whether
the team had room under the salary cap. 1 5 Furthermore,
a club had the exclusive right to renegotiate with its own
first-round draft choice after the player had completed
two years of his initial three-year contract.
Designed to control costs, the rookie provisions back-
fired. The rookie renegotiation clause placed enormous
pressure on teams to extend the contracts of valued
"rookies" before they became free agents. Furthermore,
the rookie scale contract lasted for a term of three years,
while a player who had played for one team for three con-
secutive years qualified for the Bird exception. Thus, a
team could extend the rookie scale contract without being
hampered by the salary cap.
The Bird exception allowed player salaries to skyrock-
et. The salary cap for the 1997-98 season was $26.9 mil-
lion per team. Utilizing the Bird exception, the Chicago
Bulls were able to pay Michael Jordan $33.14 million
during the 1997-98 season - more than the amount 17
teams paid for their entire rosters. The rookie-related
provisions allowed Kevin Garnett to negotiate a six-year
contract with the Minnesota Timberwolves during his
second year in the league for $125 million. Meanwhile,
veteran Alonzo Mourning inked a seven-year, $105 mil-
lion contract with the Miami Heat, and Shawn Kemp
signed a seven-year contract with the Cleveland
Cavaliers that will pay him $107 million.
16
These examples demonstrate that the exceptions
defeated both purposes of the NBA salary cap. The own-
ers had no cost certainty. During the 1997-98 season, the
final year of the former collective bargaining agreement,
24 of the 29 teams exceeded the salary cap of $26.9 mil-
lion per team. 17 Additionally, there was no real parity in
the league. The Chicago Bulls, led by Michael Jordan and
his $33 million plus salary, dominated the competition by
winning six world championships in the 1990s.
The NBA Lockout
Escalating Player Salaries
Blaming escalating player salaries, team owners pub-
licly lamented that 15 of 29 teams lost money during the
1997-98 season. Russ Granik, Deputy Commissioner of
the NBA, stated that the league was becoming unprof-
itable as a result of player salaries increasing faster than
revenue growth.18 The owners claimed that the league's
profitability had steadily declined over the four years
prior to the lockout. 19 They further claimed that, overall,
the league had posted a negative cash flow for the 1997-
98 season.20 The owners clearly implied that, unless
salaries were reined in, the financial viability of the
league was seriously in question.
Other sources did not paint the picture quite so bleak-
ly. The Players Association, which receives annual audit-
ed financial statements for the league and the teams,
concluded that only four clubs posted losses during the
1997-98 season.2 1 Analysis conducted by FORBES indi-
cated that only ten NBA teams were
in the red. 22 While not privy to the The own
financial statements of the teams,
the FORBES analysts relied on pub-
licly available information and ,mp,,C
informed estimates in reaching their
conclusions. They noted that owners unless sal
exclude most of the revenues from
key sources when calculating prof- re in
itability. Specifically, owners omit a
portion of the revenues from arena the financ
naming rights, luxury suites, and
team merchandise stores. Once the
profits generated from these rev- of the le
enue streams are added, some of the
unprofitable teams suddenly showed seriously i
a profit.
2 3
The players union responded that
if the owners were in fact losing money, they had no one
to blame but themselves. 24 After all, the teams had
agreed to pay the salaries that they later claimed were so
onerous. The collective bargaining agreement only guar-
anteed that aggregate player salaries would exceed 48.04
percent of Basketball Related Income; the owners essen-
tially volunteered to pay the players more. As National
Basketball Players Association Executive Director G.
William (Billy) Hunter summarized: "We don't see any
need to change the current process. Our position is, if you
don't want to pay it, don't do it. Just say 'No."'
25
The same agreement that secured the salaries also
empowered the owners to declare a lockout. The 1996
Agreement provided that owners could re-open the
Agreement if aggregate player salaries exceeded 51.8
percent of BRI - approximately $900 million. This
threshold was exceeded with players collecting an esti-
r
mated 57.2 percent of BRI - almost $1 billion - during
the 1997-98 season.2 6 The NBA Board of Governors, by a
27 to 2 margin, voted to exercise its right to re-open the
former CBA on March 23, 1998.27
The Owners' Positions vs. The Players' Positions
While other issues were addressed, 2 8 the greatest
divide between the league and the Players Association
concerned money. The owners sought to enact a hard
salary cap, as in the NFL. A hard cap would necessarily
eliminate the Bird exception. Naturally, the players
wanted to keep the Bird exception and other exceptions
to the salary cap. They argued that
rs clearly the Bird exception was necessary to
reward the league's best players.
Moreover, the players lobbied to
that, introduce another exception to the
cap similar to the $1 Million
iries were Exception, but with the exception
amount tied to the average player
d in, salary in the league.
The 1996 Agreement contained a
al viability three-year rookie salary scale, giving
clubs the exclusive right to renegoti-
ate with their draftees during the
igue was second contract year. The Kevin
Garnett signing proved just how
question. financially taxing the prior system
could be. To put the deal in perspec-
tive, Garnett alone received $21 mil-
lion per year while the new television deal paid each
team about $23 million annually. To allow teams more
time to assess young players before deciding to sign them
to long-term contracts, the league argued it needed to
extend the length of rookie contracts. The Players
Association agreed that a disproportionate amount was
being paid to young players and hoped to see those funds
redistributed to increase veterans' salaries. Further, the
players wanted the league minimum salary to be tied
more directly to the number of years a player had been in
the league. The owners were willing to increase mini-
mum salaries for veterans.
Finally, the two sides clashed over what percentage of
the league's growing revenues should be paid to players.
Obviously, the Players Association wanted the largest
percentage possible, noting that the NFL pays its players
over 63 percent of its revenues. The league countered
that the NFL's definition of revenues was much more
narrow than its definition of Basketball Related Income.
The owners conceded, however, that player salaries
should increase in proportion to league revenues.
The New Collective Bargaining Agreement
On January 6, 1999, the NBA and the Players
Association reached an agreement that ended the six-
month lockout and entered into a new collective bargain-
ing agreement. The players approved the new agreement
by an overwhelming 179 to 5 ratification vote on January
7, 1999.29 The Board of Governors voted in favor of the
agreement the following day.
Salary Cap and Escrow System
The new CBA raised the salary cap to $30.0 million for
the 1998-99 season and to $34.0 million for the 1999-
2000 season. 30 Thereafter, the salary cap will be based
on BRI; specifically, the cap will be equal to 48.04 percent
of the projected BRI for the year.
3 1 However, the salary
cap for the 2000-01 season is guaranteed to be at least
$35.5 million.
32
Since exceptions to the salary cap were retained,
teams may still exceed the cap. To protect teams against
spiraling salaries, the new CBA limits aggregate player
salaries to 55 percent of BRI in years four, five, and six of
the agreement. If the league exercises its option on the
seventh year, the players would be limited to receiving 57
percent of BRI.3 3
To help enforce the aggregate salary limits, the 1999
CBA established an escrow system that will become
effective in the fourth year of the Agreement.
3 4 Under
this system, ten percent of player salaries will be placed
in escrow, with the players able to decide who among
them must pay the escrow tax.
35 If aggregate player
salaries exceed 55 percent of BRI, the league will be
reimbursed (with interest) the amount of the overage by
the escrow fund. Any money remaining in the escrow
fund will be returned to the players with interest. If the
overage exceeds the amount in the escrow fund, teams
whose spending exceeds the combined percentage of the
revenue split plus the escrow will pay a dollar-for-dollar
tax to the league for redistribution on a league formula.
Player Salaries
The new CBA is unique among collective bargaining
agreements in professional sports because it establishes
a maximum salary that a player may be paid. Although
a hard salary cap indirectly limits a player's salary, no
professional sports union had ever agreed to a maximum
salary for an individual player.
36 The impact of placing a
ceiling on payments to a player was softened by the fact
that the CBA guarantees that NBA players shall have
the highest average salary for any professional team
sport.37 Additionally, no player was required to take a pay
cut. A grandfather clause allows any player to sign for 105
percent of his salary in the last year of his prior contract.
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Maximum Player Salaries
Ray Allen negotiated a 6-year, $70.9 million 1-6 Years 6-9 Years 10+ Years
contract with the Milwaukee Bucks. This table
demonstrates the structure of Allen's contract and 1 t year 
$9.000* $11.000 $14.000
other maximum six-year contracts under the 2nd year $10.125 $12.375 $15.750
current salary cap. The maximum salary applies 3rd year $11.250 $13.750 $17.500
to the first year of a contract. A Qualifying 4 year $12.375 $15.125 $19.250
Veteran Free Agent or Early Qualifying Veteran
Free Agent (i.e., players with Bird rights) may 5th year $13.500 $16.500 
$21.000
have his salary increase in each subsequent year 6 th year $14.625 $17.875 $22.750
by an amount up to 12.5% of the player's TISalay 
$70.875 $86.625 $10.250
salary in the first year of 
the contract. *i millions
The maximum salary that a player may be paid is
based on the number of years he has been in the league.
In the first year of a contract, a player with fewer than
six years in the league may be paid up to $9 million. If
the salary cap for the first year of his contract exceeds
$36.0 million, however, the player may be paid up to 25
percent of the salary cap for the first season. 39 A player
with six to nine years in the league may be paid up to $11
million in the first year of his contract. If the salary cap
exceeds $36.67 million that year, however, the player
may be paid up to 30 percent of the amount of the salary
cap in the first year.4 0 Finally, players with ten or more
years in the league may be paid up to the greater of $14
million or 35 percent of the salary cap in effect at the
time the contract is executed.
4 1
The new CBA continues to contain a three-year rookie
scale. A first-round draft pick's salary will be determined
solely by his draft position. However, the new CBA
extends the length of rookie contracts. Teams would hold
an option for the fourth year and a right of first refusal
in the fifth year. Teams would have the exclusive right to
renegotiate in the third year.4 2 If a team elects to exer-
cise its fourth-year option, the player's salary is prede-
termined for that year as well.
The new CBA dramatically raises the minimum salary
levels as well. The entry-level minimum salary was
increased. Under the new system, a player's minimum
salary increases each year he is in the league. Rookies
are guaranteed $287,000 and veterans entering their
eleventh year are guaranteed at least $1 million. Minimum
salaries above $500,000 will be paid from a league-wide
fund. The purpose of the fund is to protect older players
from getting cut in order for teams to save money.
43
Exceptions to the Salary Cap
Bowing to player demands, the 1999 Agreement creat-
ed a new exception to the salary cap. The "Mid-Level
Salary Exception" operates in much the same manner as
the $1 Million Exception 4 4 but with higher exception
amounts. The exception provides that a team may sign
one or more players during each year of the Agreement
who call for an aggregate salary not in excess of the enu-
merated exception amount in the first year of the con-
tract(s). For the 1998-99 season, the exception amount
was $1.75 million. The exception amount increases to
$2.0 million in the second year and climbs to $2.25 mil-
lion for the 2000-01 season.
The Mid-Level Salary Exception differs from the $1
Million Exception in three main respects. The first dif-
ference is the calculation of the exception amount for the
final three years (and the option year) of the Agreement.
Instead of a fixed number, the exception amount for the
Mid-Level Salary Exception is tied to the average player
salary in the league. Thus, as the average salary in the
league increases, the exception amount correspondingly
grows. Second, contracts signed pursuant to the new
exception may be up to six, rather than two, years in
length. Finally, a team may utilize the Mid-Level Salary
Exception every year instead of once every other year.
Effect of the 1999 Agreement on the Players
Under the first year of the new CBA, the average NBA
salary increased from $2.37 million to $2.64 million.
4 5
The median salary increased from $1.4 million to $1.68
million. Salaries as a whole increased 17 percent.4 6 The
players received 59 percent of BRI in 1999, up from 57
percent in 1997-98. 4 7 Now, 71 percent of all players earn
in excess of $1 million, up from 61 percent. 48 Fifty per-
cent of all players earn between $1 million and $4 million
annually, up from 44 percent. 4 9 Fifteen players signed
contracts under the new Mid-Level Salary Exception. 5
0
Aside from the ten players going into the final year of
their rookie scale contracts who signed six-year, $70.9
million extensions, only two players, Rik Smits of
Indiana and Jayson Williams of New Jersey, received the
maximum allowable salary.
51
Trends Emerging in the Sports
Representation Business
Pay Allen Negotiates His Own Salary
Shortly after the new CBA became effective, Ray Allen
chose to fire his agent Mason Ashe and represent himself
in contract negotiations with the Milwaukee Bucks.5 2
The former University of Connecticut guard negotiated
directly with team owner Herb Kohl. Allen believed that
he deserved the maximum salary the team could offer
and Kohl was willing to pay Allen the maximum. The two
agreed that Allen would be awarded a six-year, $70.9
million dollar contract extension, the maximum salary
allowed for a third-year player under the new CBA.53 In
that respect, Allen's contract is almost identical to the
contracts signed by other rising stars Kobe Bryant, 5 4
Application of the Mid-Level Salary Exception
How a Contract Might Be Structured
Example 1 depicts a player entering the 2000-01 season. The
computation assumes that the player signs for the entire exemption
amount, signs for the maximum six-ear term, and gets the
maximum annual increase. The maximum annual increase is 10% of
the salary for the first season of the contract. Thus, the player's salary
may increase by an amount up to $225,000 each year.
Example 2 assumes that a player is entering the 2001-02 season, the
first season that the exemption amount is based on the average
player salary. The average player salary for 1999-2000 was $2.64
Million. If we assume that player salaries increase by an annual rate of
8%, the average player salary will climb to approximately $2.85
million for the 2000-01 season. The 1999 Agreement provides that
the exemption amount for the 2001-02 season shall be 108% of the
average player salary for the previous season. As a result, the
exemption amount for the 2001-02 season would be just over $3
million. Again, the computation assumes that the player signs for the
entire exemption amount, signs for the maximum six-year term, and
gets the maximum annual increase.
Allen Iverson, ShareefAbdur-Rahim, and Antoine Walker.
Once the essential terms of the contract were final-
ized, Allen hired a team of representatives to review the
deal. Allen utilized the services of two attorneys -
Jeremiah DeBerry and high-profile litigator Johnnie
Cochran - his business manager Mark Christie and
accountant Michael Horsey. Instead of paying these rep-
resentatives a commission based on the size of the con-
tract, he paid them all an hourly rate of up to $500. Allen
said of this arrangement: "I don't need somebody skim-
ming millions off the top."5 5 As he explained later, "It
was merely a good business decision. I don't need an
agent. I know how much money I'm going to make. If
you're smart, and know what you're doing, you can nego-
tiate what you're worth." 56
Other players have taken Allen's lead. Charlotte
Hornets all-star guard Eddie Jones has reportedly fired
his agent Sal Difazio and plans to hire an attorney to
help him negotiate his next contract. 5
7 Some recent draft
picks such as former Utah standout Andre Miller also are
forgoing agents in favor of attorneys.
58 Shortly after
signing a maximum salary deal under the new CBA,
Allen Iverson of the Philadelphia 76ers fired high-profile
agent David Falk. Iverson said that he could have nego-
tiated the deal himself, stating: "I fired him because I felt
that with the new collective bargaining agreement, all I
needed was [sic] my lawyers."
5 9
Example 1 Example 2
First Season of Contract 2000-01 2001-02
Exemption Amount $2,250,000 $3,000,000 (est)
Year 1 $2,250,000 $3,300,000
Year 2 $2,475,000 $3,600,000
Year 3 $2,700,000 $3,600,000
Year 4 $2,925,000 $4,200,000
Year 5 $3,150,000 $4,500,000
Year 6 $3,375,000 $4,800,000
Total Contract Value $16,875,000 $27,300,000
The foregoing examples demonstrate the largest contracts that a player could receive utilizing the Mid-
Level Salary Exemption, The same amounts ould be split between two or among several players.
Although Allen has been much ballyhooed in the press
as a pioneer, he was not the first player to either repre-
sent himself or utilize the hourly services of an attorney
to negotiate a contract. New York Knicks forward Buck
Williams represented himself during the latter stages of
his 17-year basketball career. Two-time league MVP
Karl Malone hired an agent for the first time in 1998
after 13 years in the NBA.60 Grant Hill has never uti-
lized the services of an agent; instead, he is the client of
Washington attorney Lon Babby. Tim Duncan, Jerome
Williams, Christian Laettner, Cherokee Parks, and Pat
Garrity are all also clients of Babby.6 1 Even Allen him-
self admits: "It's nothing new. That's why it struck me as
odd everybody was so surprised. I've seen and heard
about guys doing it without agents before."
6 2
Consolidation of Sports Representation Firms
It is clear that the economics of player representation
are changing. Recently, SFX Entertainment ("SFX") and
Assante Corporation ("Assante") have made aggressive
entries into the sports representation business through
rapid strings of acquisitions. Both companies proclaim
the advantages of their size and ability to offer a wide
range of services to clients. SFX seeks to represent ath-
letes, teams, leagues, sports properties, and corporations
in areas as diverse as talent representation and market-
m
ing, stadium and arena naming rights, television produc-
tion and programming, licensing and public relations,
event management, and online services. 63 Assante, on
the other hand, boasts that it offers full-service talent
representation, business management, and personal sup-
port services to its clients.
6 4
Over a period of 18 months, SFX has acquired 14
sports marketing and management agencies and consoli-
dated them into the SFX Sports Group. 65 In 1998, SFX
began by acquiring high-profile basketball agent David
Falk's agency, Falk Associates Management Enterprises
or FAME, for a little over $120 million. 66 The company
then quickly followed up by purchasing The Marquee
Group, an international sports marketing firm, in an all-
stock deal valued at almost $100 million. 6 7 Prior to the
SFX buyout, Marquee had acquired ProServ, the sports
representation agency founded by tennis star Donald
Dell. SFX also has acquired such firms as Integrated
Sports International (ISI), Tellen & Associates,
Hendricks Management Company, and SME Design.
Assante, a Canadian entertainment and financial
management company, announced its entry into the
sports agency business by acquiring the business of
Leigh Steinberg, one of the nation's leading agents, for
up to $120 million.68 Assante completed the acquisition
of Steinberg, Moorad & Dunn effective November 9,
1999.69 Assante teamed Steinberg, Moorad & Dunn with
business managers NKS Management, Inc. 70 and
Philpott, Bills & Sto117 1 to create Assante's Sports and
Entertainment Group. 72 Less than two months later,
Assante acquired Eugene Parker & Associates, Inc.,
which does business as Maximum Sports Management. 73
Prior to its acquisition, Maximum Sports Management
had grown into the third largest representation firm of
professional football players and represented over 60
football and basketball players.
7 4
How the New Agreement Will Affect the
Player-Agent Relationship
The NBA Players Association's Agent Regulation
Program provides that an agent may be paid up to four
percent of a player's contract. While the new CBA does
not change the maximum percentage that agents can
charge, changes in the 1999 Agreement may dramatical-
ly affect the manner in which they are compensated.
Specifically, agents offering only contract negotiation ser-
vices may be paid a smaller commission or by the hour.
Players Question the Need for a Tr, uioral Agent
Many athletes perceive agents as a necessary evil. 7 5
They view agents as providing the single service of nego-
tiating their contracts. Were it not for that one - albeit
important - function, they would never employ agents
at all. To the extent that an agent procures endorsement
deals for the player, the agent is paid a separate com-
mission. Not surprisingly, many players with this mind-
set believe that agents are overpaid.
Obviously, commission-based compensation encour-
ages agents to negotiate top dollar for their clients. The
1999 Agreement, however, diminishes the force of such
incentives by pre-determining how much certain classes
of players will be paid. First, the maximum salary for a
marquee veteran now has a ceiling. The maximum salary
limitation, of course, will only apply to a select number of
players each year.7 6 While no player is guaranteed a
maximum salary contract, most of the league's premier
players will no doubt seek and be awarded one. The
majority of these players, like Ray Allen, will be aware of
their market value without consulting an agent. Were
Allen to have paid the maximum four percent commis-
sion to negotiate his contract extension, the commission
would have topped $2.8 million. Since it is not uncommon
for players to ask their agents to reduce their commission
rates, it is unlikely that Allen would have paid the max-
imum commission had he utilized an agent. For example,
he paid his agent Lee Fentress $12,000 to negotiate his
first contract, well below the four percent maximum.
Under the 1999 Agreement, star players will have even
greater reason to insist on lower agent fees.
Next, minimum salaries have been dramatically
raised. Over 20 percent of players would have been paid
the league minimum entering the 1998-99 season. By
raising minimum salary levels for veterans, even greater
numbers of players may be playing for the higher mini-
mums in the future. The idea of paying a commission to
receive the minimum salary is not particularly attractive
to athletes.
77
Finally, every rookie drafted in the first round will be
paid a set salary for his first three years in the league.
Regardless of representation, the first player selected in
the year 2000 draft will sign a three-year, $9.5408 mil-
lion contract with a first year salary of $2,947,200; the
final player selected in the first round of the year 2000
draft will be eligible to receive a three-year, $1.9 million
contract. 78 Similarly, the 1999 CBA spells out each first-
round draft pick's salary in his fourth year, if his team
exercises its option. What was once a matter of negotia-
tion is now a matter of consulting a table.
Agents as Full Service Advisors
Certain agents do focus solely on contract negotiation
and endorsements. The majority, however, provide a
broad array of other services to their clients. They may
provide tax planning and preparation; cash flow man-
agement and budgeting; retirement and estate planning;
investment and trust management;
insurance planning; assistance buy-
ing homes and automobiles; and other
business management services such
as liaising between the player and
team management, banks, accoun-
tants, and attorneys. Agents also may
help players establish charitable
foundations and plan for life after
sports.
Most agents provide personal man-
agement services as well. They may
help coordinate travel arrangements;
schedule personal appearances and
press conferences for public relations
and marketing; coordinate off-season
workouts, training, and dieting;
buffer the player from the outside
world; and provide personal advice of
all types. The types of services that
agents provide is limited only by per-
sonality. Whether getting tickets to a
jazz concert, hiring a cleaning service
to take care of the player's house,
ensuring that the player's pet is cared
Nevertheless, many rookies still paid their agents the
maximum allowable commission. Presumably, then,
some players truly do value the additional services pro-
vided by their agents or believe that a good agent can bol-
ster their draft position.
If he so chooses, an athlete can get most of the services
offered by an agent from other sources. An attorney can
negotiate contracts and endorsements, provide tax and
estate planning advice, and provide career and personal
counseling. An accountant or financial advisor can pre-





to insist on lower
agent fees ....
What once was a
matter of negotiation
is now a matter of
consulting a table.
or automobiles, create a retirement
plan, and help acquire insurance.
Investment advisors can manage a
player's portfolio. Of course, all of
these service providers must be
compensated.
To the extent that most profes-
sionals are paid by the hour, clients
seek to minimize their services.
Thus, an athlete may fail to seek
advice or counsel even when neces-
sary to avoid the associated cost.
More often, however, a young ath-
lete may not even realize that he
should seek counsel on a particular
issue. Paying a trusted advisor a
fixed fee or commission, on the
other hand, eliminates the disin-
centive to seek advice when appro-
priate. Good agents are proactive;
they initiate contact with their
clients in order to discover and
anticipate potential problems. An
athlete can feel comfortable relat-
ing his experiences, simply chat-
for during a vacation, or reminding a player to change the
oil in his car, an agent is a counselor in the broadest sense.
While an attorney may be fully equipped to negotiate
a contract or endorsement deal, establish a charitable
foundation, or provide tax and estate planning advice,
few attorneys are equipped to provide the full range of
business and personal services required by many profes-
sional athletes. Under the 1999 Agreement, it would
seem that a rookie has little reason to pay an agent a
commission for negotiating his contract. The 1996
Agreement also contained a rookie salary scale providing
the same reason to reduce the fees paid to an agent.
ting or discussing his concerns at length with his agent
without fear of being invoiced for the conversation later.
Large, Consolidated R presentation C;m i y vs.
Boutique Agency
Despite the rapid consolidation in the industry, there
will always be a place for the small "boutique" agency in
the world of professional sports. Economic necessity will
force the large, consolidated agencies to focus on attract-
ing established players and highly sought-after young
players. They will not be able to justify devoting ade-
quate resources to maintain smaller or less promising
accounts. While almost all agents attempt to stay in close
contact with their clients, an agent with just one super-
star may actually travel with his or her client during the
season. This level of service is something that a large
agency with numerous clients will never be able to offer.
Additionally, most players will never have the renown
to take advantage of the marketing leverage promoted by
the large agencies. It is unlikely that one of the large cor-
porate clients represented by SFX Sports Group will cen-
ter an advertising campaign around a second-string
small forward. The typical professional athlete must
focus on smaller local endorsements in the team's city or
the player's hometown. That player may be able to make
an appearance at a local electronics store in exchange for
a new stereo system.
The "one-stop shopping" approach taken by these large
agencies suffers from other disadvantages as well. An
athlete who entrusts one company to manage all aspects
of his career from contract negotiation to endorsements,
from marketing to cash and investment management
will have a lack of diversity of opinions. For example,
intelligent people may differ on whether an athlete
should endorse a particular product or seek to be traded
to a different team. If all of a player's career advice comes
from a single source, there is a danger that the player
will not have all sides adequately presented. Another
disadvantage is the absence of checks and balances. A
player would be better served having a team of profes-
sional advisors - including an agent, an accountant, and
an independent financial advisor - watching out for the
player and watching each other, rather than trusting a
single organization to police itself.
After weighing the advantages of a large, consolidated
company against a small boutique agency, many athletes
- from superstars to minimum salary players - will
choose the smaller firm. Thus, small boutique agencies
promising strong personal service will continue to thrive.
In fact, more of these agencies may spring up due to the
valuations given to sports representation firms in this
recent trend of consolidation. Some top agents and young
agents with promising futures who are currently working
for recently-acquired firms will likely open their own
agencies, hoping for a lucrative buy-out offer.
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As the NBA adjusts to the new agreement, more play-
ers are likely to engage attorneys to negotiate their con-
tracts. Given the level of compensation some NBA play-
ers receive, the idea of paying an hourly fee instead of a
commission is too attractive to ignore. Ray Allen may be
perceived as the first, but he will certainly not be the last.
This trend by no means signals an end to agents or
commissions. The 1999 Agreement reduces the uncer-
tainty associated with contract negotiations, weakening
the rationale to pay a commission for contract negotia-
tion services. The emphasis now has shifted to the other
services that an agent offers and the value of those ser-
vices. Thus, agents who currently only negotiate con-
tracts and secure endorsements will face enormous pres-
sure to reduce commissions, work for a flat or hourly fee,
or broaden their services.
A wave of consolidation has already begun, fueled by
this desire to expand the services offered to athletes.
These large, consolidated agencies will attempt to lever-
age their client base to create new revenue streams.
Their impressive array of services and resources may
appeal to many players. Instead of squeezing out the
smaller firms, however, the rise of the mega-agency will
open an opportunity for more boutique agencies promis-
ing to deliver strong personal service. A small firm, work-
ing in conjunction with other service providers, will be
able to mirror the services of its larger competitors but
have the advantage of diverse viewpoints and a more vig-
ilant system of checks and balances.
Ray Allen's success in negotiating his own contract
may lead other players to believe that they would not
benefit from employing a zealous advocate or, more
importantly, other professionals to help them manage
their business affairs. Instead, the lesson that players
should learn is not necessarily to fire their agents, but to
become better-educated consumers of their representa-
tion services.
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